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Human Security with an Asian Face?
SUNG WON KiM*
INTRODUCTION
The twenty-first century may well be remembered as the Asian
century.' The rise of Asian countries in world politics creates conditions
for the possible emergence of an Asian-influenced international system
and an Asian perspective on international law and global governance,
which, together, can be called an "Eastphalian order." The development
of an Eastphalian order will not only reflect the interests of Asian
countries and peoples, but also will contain a vision for international
law and global governance that will affect world affairs and
globalization in the coming decades.
The possible emergence of an Eastphalian order provides food for
thought for Asian countries to reflect on Western-dominated rules,
systems, and institutions of international law and global governance
that have shaped the development of Asia for many decades. Since at
least the birth of the Westphalian state system in 1648, Western
countries have shaped international relations through their material
power and political interests, as evidenced by imperialism and
colonialism. Asia was a main target of Western imperialism and
colonialism, and the Western imperial powers exploited and damaged
many Asian countries. Considering the historical experiences of Asian
countries, the rise of Asian material power and political influence in
global affairs might herald an opportunity for Asian countries to effect
lasting reforms in international relations according to Asian-preferred
ideas, particularly with respect to how international law and global
governance function. The Asian region is already beginning to enjoy the
material benefits of the growth of Asian economic and political power,
* Second Secretary of International Legal Affairs Division, Treaties Bureau, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea; Member, Korean Society of International
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particularly with respect to the widely acknowledged emergence of two
Asian great powers, China and India. However, whether these Asian
great powers and other countries in the region will shape or transform
the prevailing ideas alive in twenty-first century international politics
remains to be seen.
As noted frequently in this symposium 2 and elsewhere,3 Asian
countries have long stressed the principles of sovereignty and
noninterference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, whether
collectively through regional organizations or bilaterally in their
respective foreign policies. These principles are neither new nor
distinctively Asian because they find identical counterparts in the
development of the Westphalian international system and in the
Charter of the United Nations. Asian commitment to the principles of
sovereignty and noninterference certainly contrasts with post-Cold War
Western-inspired efforts to limit sovereignty and qualify the principle of
noninterference. The West has pursued these aims by advancing
purported rules of post-Westphalian international law, such as human
rights, humanitarian intervention, the responsibility to protect, and the
right to democratic government. At some level, all of these rules require
international community scrutiny of and interference with the domestic
affairs of many states.
The combination of Asia's growing material power and its
longstanding commitment to principles of sovereignty and
noninterference raises questions about the future of post-Cold War
concepts of international law and global governance, especially the
concept of "human security." This article analyzes what the emergence
of an Eastphalian order might mean for efforts to improve human
security. The concept of human security grew in importance during the
post-Cold War period, drawing both adherents and detractors to its
attempt to shift security thinking away from the state and toward
individuals. Human security also seemed to resonate with concerns
about how globalization rendered traditional notions of sovereignty and
security less relevant, creating the need for more innovative ways to
think about and achieve security. Some scholars have expressed worry
that the rise of Asian countries in world politics may threaten the future
2. See Tom Ginsburg, Eastphalia as the Perfection of Westphalia, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 27, 28, 34 (2010); David P. Fidler & Sumit Ganguly, India and Eastphalia,
17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 147, 150-51 (2010); Men Honghua, East Asian Order
Formation and Sino-Japanese Relations, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 47, 68-69 (2010);
Chang-fa Lo, Values to be Added to Eastphalia by the Emerging China, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 13, 16-17 (2010).
3. Sung Won Kim, David P. Fidler & Sumit Ganguly, Eastphalia Rising? Asian
Influence and the Fate of Human Security, 26 WORLD POL'Y J. 53, 53 (2009).
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of human security as a concept and policy objective.4 Whether such a
threat actually emerges depends on how Asian countries perceive
human security in light of their philosophical heritage, political
principles, and material interests. Predicting the trajectory of human
security in an Eastphalian order proves a very complicated task.
This article proceeds in five parts. First, it briefly analyzes the
concept of human security and its relevance to international law and
global governance in the early twenty-first century. Second, the article
explores why the Asian region might constitute an interesting
laboratory for the human security project despite the longstanding
commitment of Asian countries to the principles of sovereignty and
noninterference. Third, it looks at the relevance of Confucian thinking
in order to see whether this powerful philosophical heritage of many
Asian societies contains insight that may help shape the evolution of
Asian perspectives on human security. Fourth, the article briefly
considers Japan's efforts to embrace the human security concept in its
foreign policy, especially its development assistance. Finally, it
considers whether the emergence of a more Asian-centric international
system can develop a distinctive Asian contribution to the problems the
concept of human security was developed to address.
I. THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN SECURITY AND ITS IMPACT ON THINKING
ABOUT SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Traditional notions of security, shaped largely by the structure and
dynamics of the Cold War, were concerned mainly with a state's ability
to counter external military threats from rival states. The conventional
view of security is largely dependent on accepting the dominance of the
Westphalian state system, which is composed of states as the dominant
actors. Under traditional security ideas, the only real security concern is
for a state to maintain its survival, power, and political influence
against external threats from rival states.
After the end of the Cold War and the subsequent impact of a new
phase of globalization, the rise of new types of security threats
challenged the traditional perspective on security, with its focus on the
survival of states. These new threats included such dangers as
environmental pollution, transnational terrorism, massive population
movements, and infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS. 5 These new,
nontraditional security threats pose dangers not only to the security of
4. See, e.g., id.
5. Comm'n on Human Security, Human Security Now, at 5 (May 1, 2003) [hereinafter
Human Security Now], available at http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/
English/FinalReport.pdf.
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the state (national security), but also to the security of individuals and
communities (human security). Behind the perceived rise of these new
security threats is the idea that the security of individuals cannot be
protected by the military capabilities of states because these capabilities
do not provide defenses against transnational dangers accelerated by
globalization. In these circumstances, the security conditions of
individual human beings are more vulnerable to newly emerging
security threats, creating the need to think about security policy in very
different ways.
The idea of human security was most famously introduced in the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report of 1994.6 The
UNDP asserted that human security has two main elements: protection
from (1) threats, such as hunger, disease, and repression; and (2)
sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life.7 The UNDP
also asserted that globalization creates the need to think about security
in human rather than state-centric terms: "In the globalizing world of
shrinking time, shrinking space and disappearing borders, people are
confronting new threats to human security-sudden and harmful
disruption in the pattern of daily life."8 According to the UNDP, there
are seven specific elements that comprise human security: (1) economic
security, (2) food security, (3) health security, (4) environmental
security, (5) personal security, (6) community security, and (7) political
security.
9
The human security concept seeks to reframe the pursuit of security
by placing individual human beings at the center of security concerns.
0
Tigerstrom indicates that the human-centered focus of the human
security concept demands explicit attention to the needs and interests of
individuals and gives analytical and moral priority to individuals' needs
and interests over those of states.11 She also points out that the core of
this human-centered approach is the normative priority of people's
security, especially in relation to states' security. According to Fidler,
the theoretical foundation of human security is rooted in the theory of
6. U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of
Human Security, at 22 (1994) [hereinafter UNDP Report 1994], available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdrl994.
7. Id. at 23.
8. U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Development Report 1999: Globalization with a
Human Face, at 3 (1999) [hereinafter UNDP Report 1999], available at
http://hdr.undp.orgten/reports/global/hdrl999/.
9. UNDP Report 1994, supra note 6, at 24-25.
10. BARBARA VON TIGERSTROM, HUMAN SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS 8 (2007).
11. Id. at 62 .
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social constructivism.12 Fidler notes that "social constructivists would
focus, thus, on the ideational move away from the narrow, realist
concept of national security toward more expansive notions of security,
such as human security, a shift that illustrates the power of ideas to
shape how humans socially construct their relations globally."'
3
Under human security, a security threat can be construed as any
menace to "the quality of life of individuals."' 4 Thus, human security
regards the problems of hunger, poverty, environmental degradation,
underdevelopment, infectious diseases, and even natural disasters (such
as tsunamis) as the most urgent security threats to the daily life of
individuals. 5 Human security highlights the interdependence of these
various security concerns. For instance, if one group or individual is
threatened, many other communities are also likely at risk. Violations
of human rights and human security in a state cannot be contained in
that one state alone. This perspective reveals an intrinsic aspect of
human security: all humankind is inextricably connected.'
6
Human security represents a challenge to the traditional notion of
security, which has been dominated by a realpolitik security
perspective, by placing individual human beings at the center of
security concerns. Theoretically, realpolitik security flows from the
theory of realism, which emphasizes four features of international
relations: (1) statism, (2) anarchy among states, (3) survival of states,
and (4) the self-help system.' 7 In essence, realism holds that the state is
the preeminent actor and that all other actors in international politics
are of lesser significance.'8
Under realism, state competition for material power brings about
the security dilemma from which no state can escape. 9 The security
dilemma occurs when two or more states each feel insecure vis-a-vis
12. David P. Fidler, Public Health and National Security in the Global Age: Infectious
Diseases, Bioterrorism, and Realpolitik, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 788, 810 (2003).
13. Id.
14. Matthew Weissberg, Conceptualizing Human Security, 13 SWORD &
PLOUGHSHARES 3, 7 (2003).
15. Human security generally contextualizes the threats to the daily life of people
multi-dimensionally. For example, it deals with the problem of public health, especially
the prevalence of infectious diseases, in combination with poverty and underdevelopment.
See BERTRAND G. RAMCHARAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN SECURITY 31-49 (2002).
16. Weissberg, supra note 14, at 4-5.
17. Tim Dunne & Brian C. Schmidt, Realism, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD
POLITICs: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 141, 150-55 (John Baylis &
Steve Smith eds., 2nd ed. 2001).
18. Id. at 150-51.
19. On the security dilemma, see John Baylis, International and Global Security in the
Post-Cold War Era, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 17, at 253, 257.
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other states. Under anarchy and the self-help system, no state feels
secure, and no state trusts other states not to take aggressive actions.
Thus, states make considerable efforts to strengthen their security
needs by increasing military forces. One state's effort increases
insecurity for other states, and this security dilemma easily leads to
tensions, conflict, and war.20 Although this dilemma can be mitigated
(e.g., through balance of power alliances), realism maintains that it
cannot be surmounted as long as states possess ultimate military and
material power in a political context characterized by anarchy.
Consequently, states have no choice but to pursue power as an
overriding imperative.2 1
Because states' military and material capabilities have paramount
importance in realpolitik security, this approach takes seriously neither
nonmilitary nor nonmaterial capabilities of states, such as human
rights, the rule of law, and democratic government. 22 In this context,
nonmilitary or nonmaterial capabilities or attributes of states only
matter in realpolitik security to the extent that these capabilities
directly affect states' military or material capabilities.
However, under the impacts of globalization, military and material
capabilities do not necessarily enhance the security of states. In other
words, no matter how much states fortify military capabilities and
reinforce alliances with other states for the protection of their security,
their efforts may be ineffective against new threats driven by
globalization.23 These globalized threats make realpolitk security
obsolete as a perspective on security issues. In addition, realpolitik
security has little to offer conceptually or practically in terms of policies
for addressing the new transnational security concerns fueled by
globalization. In this sense, the attempt of human security to place the
protection of individual human beings before that of the state directly
challenges essentially every aspect of realpolitk security.
The rise of human security as a concept in international relations
and international law has been fueled by the convergence of the latest
phase of globalization and the strengthening of the global human rights
movement. First, the loss of power and control by states and
intergovernmental organizations caused by the turbulence of
globalization creates, or, perhaps, exacerbates, potential new threats to
20. Id.
21. Edward A. Kolodziej, Security Theory: Six Paradigms Searching for Security, in
MILLENNIAL REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 547, 551 (Michael Brecher &
Frank Harvey eds., 2002).
22. Fidler, supra note 12, at 802-03.
23. See DONALD M. SNOW, NATIONAL SECURITY FOR A NEW ERA: GLOBALIZATION AND
GEOPOLITICS 155-60, 243-50, 282-95 (2004).
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individual lives. Many individuals are exposed to various threats that
have become increasingly transnationalized, such as corruption,
repression, discrimination, extreme poverty, and disease. These threats
cannot be addressed effectively within the traditional structure and
dynamics of the Westphalian state system, exposing its myopic
perspective on what constitutes a security threat.24 Thus, there is an
urgent necessity to reconsider globalized security concerns that directly
affect the daily life of individuals.
Second, the human rights movement has made a critical
contribution to the emergence of the idea of human security. The
concept of human rights contains a fundamental belief in the
indivisibility of security and human rights.25 This belief well suits the
insecurities individuals face in a world of globalized problems. Under
the indivisibility of security and human rights, there can be no security
for individuals if the right to life is endangered. Similarly, security is
also absent when individuals are denied the right to subsistence
through the denial of food, clothing, or housing. If security is defined as
protection from harm, then the infringement of fundamental rights
creates insecurity.2 6 In this context, the expanding activities of NGOs,
such as Amnesty International, Doctors Without Borders, and the
International Committee of the Red Cross, reflect this linkage between
security and human rights. In sum, the indivisibility of security and
human rights, stimulated by the human rights movement, can be
considered an essential factor contributing to the rise of human
security.
Although human security represents a powerful perspective in the
age of globalization, there are debates about the definition, applicability,
and relevance of human security in international relations today.2 7 The
most powerful criticism of human security is that it is an overly broad
and obscure concept of security.28 The lack of a precise scope and
definition of human security makes the tenets of human security appear
meaningless, especially to policy makers. Moreover, even scholars who
claim that human security has relevance do not suggest that the human
24. Tim Dunne & Nicholas J. Wheeler, "We the Peoples. Contending Discourses of
Security in Human Rights Theory and Practice, 18 INT'L REL. 9, 12 (2004).
25. Id. at 18.
26. Id.
27. See Taylor Owen, Human Security---Conflict, Critique, and Consensus: Colloquium
Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition, 35 SEC. DIALOGUE 373 (2004)
(summarizing human security debates).
28. See Roland Paris, Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?, 26 INT'L SEC. 87,
94-95 (2001).
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security approach embodies a unified approach to security.29 Paris notes,
for example, that "the existing definition of human security tends to be
extraordinarily expansive and vague, encompassing everything from
physical security to psychological well-being, which provides
policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing
policy goals and academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be
studied. 3 °
Human security comes under sharp critique because of its
skepticism about states and the role of state-centric international
organizations in security concerns. Although human security's emphasis
on the importance of nonstate actors may be relevant given
globalization's impacts and the growing power of human rights
thinking, it has a somewhat skeptical view of the potential for
cooperation among states and intergovernmental organizations.
However, states and intergovernmental organizations still play an
essential role in managing global security, however defined, because
states still retain enormous material power." In fact, the elaboration
and development of human security policies require multidimensional
cooperation among states and intergovernmental organizations. For
instance, official development assistance from developed countries to
developing countries plays a huge role in reducing extreme poverty.3
2
Additionally, as explored below, Japan's commitment to the concept of
human security is largely expressed through its development aid
programs. Moreover, considering the efforts of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) on economic growth and the impact of
international trade on poverty reduction in many countries, the U.N.
Secretary-General has advocated closer and more productive
cooperation between the U.N. and WTO.33
Despite the controversies surrounding the concept of human
security, the idea has arrived as an important aspect of the dialogue in
29. For example, King and Murray simply suggest that only the matters that people
would be willing to fight over can be the content of the human security perspective. See
Gary King & Christopher J. L. Murray, Rethinking Human Security, 116 POL. Sc. Q. 585,
593 (2002).
30. Paris, supra note 28, at 88.
31. The U.N. has been making a significant effort to elaborate and develop human
security. On the recent elaboration and development of human security, see Human
Security Now, supra note 5; U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL'S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE, A MORE SECURE
WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, U.N. Sales No. E.05.I.5 (2004); U.N. DEP'T OF PUB.
INFO., REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAI-IN LARGER FREEDOM: TOWARDS
DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL, U.N. Sales No. E.05.I.15 (2005)
[hereinafter IN LARGER FREEDOM].
32. IN LARGER FREEDOM, supra note 31, at 15-17.
33. See id. at 22.
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contemporary international relations generally and in international law
and global governance specifically. Problems and skepticism typically
stalk ideas on the cutting edge of global politics, and human security is
no exception, having its fair share of detractors and opponents. The
controversy concerns whether human security is one of the leading
normative ideas confronting policy makers in the twenty-first century.
Thus, understanding how this concept relates to the potential
emergence of an Eastphalian order is worth exploring.
II. ASIA AS THE LEADING LABORATORY FOR THE
FUTURE OF HuMAN SECURITY
The rise of the human security concept in international relations
and the rise of Asia in world affairs have happened simultaneously
within the past twenty years. Thinking about human security from the
perspective of Asian countries is, thus, more than an academic exercise
because whether and how Asian nations accept this concept will have
significant impact on the trajectory of this normative refraining of the
security debate in national and global governance. This section explores
whether the aspects of Asian countries' perspectives on human security
offer prospects for Asian countries to become leaders in the development
and refinement of the human security concept. In short, the human
security debate offers an opportunity to peer into what an Asian
perspective on international law and global governance for the early
twenty-first century might contain.
The premise of the analysis is not that Asian countries presently
have a unitary perspective on human security and its implications for
international law and global governance. For example, Japan's embrace
of human security as an objective of its foreign policy contrasts with
China's and India's more skeptical perspectives and concerns about this
concept, especially as it relates to the principles of sovereignty and
noninterference. Not surprisingly, many Asian countries have been
participating in the arguments about what human security means.3 a
Differences among Asian countries can be seen through viewing
attitudes toward human security's close relationship with two kinds of
freedom: freedom from fear and freedom from want. Connecting the goal
of freedom from want with human security, former U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan emphasized that men and women should be free
from want so that threats such as extreme poverty and infectious
34. On the different views of human security among Asian countries, see Arabinda
Acharya & Amitav Acharya, Human Security in Asia: Conceptual Ambiguities and
Common Understanding, at 12-18 (Feb. 12, 2001), (transcript available at
http://www.yorku.ca/robarts/archives/chandigarth/pdf/acharya delhi.pdf).
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diseases are lifted from their lives.35 With respect to freedom from fear,
Annan noted that "the threats to peace and security in the twenty-first
century include not just international war and conflict but civil violence,
organized crime, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. They also
include poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental
degradation, since these can have equally catastrophic consequences."36
In terms of freedom from fear, the Secretary-General stressed that all
men and. women should be free from fear so that their lives and
livelihood are not ripped apart by violence, war, and other forces
destructive to individual and social safety and security.
37
The freedom from fear and freedom from want concepts circulate in
Asian debates about human security. Anwar notes the following:
[A]lthough the two dimensions of human security-
freedom from needs and freedom from fear-have been
emphasized equally in official documents, it is no secret
that for most NGOs and observers in Asia the main
focus of interest is freedom from fear. Although
overcoming poverty is important, there has been very
little debate about the subject at either the national or
the regional level.38
Contrary to Anwar's observation, some Asian states have criticized
linking human security too closely with freedom from fear. For example,
while acknowledging the two elements of human security, Japan
criticizes those who focus solely on freedom from fear. One Japanese
official stated:
[H]uman security is a much broader concept. We believe
that freedom from want is no less critical than freedom
from fear. So long as its objectives are to ensure the
survival and dignity of individuals as human beings, it
is necessary to go beyond thinking of human security
solely in terms of protecting human life in conflict
situations.39
35. IN LARGER FREEDOM, supra note 31, at 6.
36. Id. at 33.
37. Id. at 6.
38. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Human Security: An Intractable Problem in Asia, in ASIAN
SECURITY ORDER: INSTRUMENTAL AND NORMATIVE FEATURES 536, 541 (Muthiah Alagappa
ed., 2003).
39. Yukio Takaso, Director-General, Foreign Ministry of Japan, Statement at the
International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World (May 8, 2000), cited in
Archarya & Archarya, supra note 34, at 15.
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More important analytically than such differences over where the
emphasis in human security ought to be placed is whether Asian
perspectives on international relations are conducive or receptive to
either the freedom from fear or freedom from want aspects of the human
security concept. As explored above, the human security concept
involves a radical challenge to traditional ways of thinking about
security. Human security changes the focus of the security debate away
from the state and toward the individual. Almost by definition, human
security looks past sovereignty to peer inside the state and assess how
the state secures freedom from fear and freedom from want. The human
security concept is heavily influenced by human rights principles; thus,
the substantive content of human security has a universal quality
across nations and cultures.
Finally, the human security project seems interested in holding
states accountable for how they secure freedom from fear and want for
their citizens. In short, pursuing human security involves the need to
intervene in the domestic affairs of states to assess, admonish, or assist
efforts to increase each individual's freedom from fear and want. When
human security is gravely endangered within a state, human security
policies embrace the right for other countries to raise questions and
even to intervene, perhaps even by military force, under the principle of
the responsibility to protect or the more general imperative of
humanitarian intervention. The responsibility to protect expressly
indicates that the foundation of this principle hes in obligations
inherent in the concept of sovereignty.40 Furthermore, the responsibility
to protect principle asserts that where a population is suffering serious
harm as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression, or state failure,
and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the
principle of nonintervention yields to the international responsibility to
protect.
4 1
In all these respects, the human security concept is quintessentially
post-Westphalian because it challenges the traditional notion of
sovereignty, tests sovereignty against a universal standard of human
treatment, and advocates for intervention into the domestic affairs of
states that do not work toward providing their people with freedom from
fear and want. However, the general positions of Asian countries,
especially with their emphasis on sovereignty and noninterference, do
not embrace the post-Westphalian features of human security, such as
40. Int'l Comm'n on Intervention and State Sovereignty [ICISS], The Responsibility to
Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, at
XI (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf.
41. Id.
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humanitarian intervention under the principle of the responsibility to
protect or building transnational civil society networks to bring pressure
to bear on national governments.
The presence of many types of threats to all aspects of human
security in Asia makes the region a potentially leading policy laboratory
for this concept. A brief examination of the approaches taken by the
three big Asian powers-Japan, China, and India-reveals different
perspectives that reflect a complex picture of human security. As
mentioned above, Japan has made human security a central feature of
its foreign policy through, for example, providing support for the work of
the Commission on Human Security and funding a Trust Fund for
Human Security within the United Nations. Japan also views its
development assistance to many countries as a feature of its work to
improve human security.
However, the Japanese embrace of human security as a policy
objective has some interesting features. First, as one of the world's most
affluent, advanced, and stable democracies, Japan does not face much, if
any, human security scrutiny of its domestic affairs by other countries,
international organizations, or NGOs. Thus, its emphasis on human
security in its external affairs does not have much potential to create a
"boomerang" effect on Japan's handling of its domestic affairs. Second,
Japan finds the human security approach helpful in raising its political
and economic profile in Asia and beyond without raising too many
concerns about Japanese national interests and intentions. Third,
Japan's implementation of development assistance under its human
security agenda does not challenge the sovereignty of recipient states or
infringe on the principle of noninterference, especially assistance
destined for fellow Asian countries. In sum, Japan's embrace of human
security creates no domestic political concerns; conveniently helps
Japan's efforts to increase its bilateral, regional, and global political and
economic influence; and adheres to the principles of sovereignty and
noninterference.
China's position is considerably different. Although ideas animating
the concept of human security, such as freedom from want and freedom
from fear, resonate with goals the Chinese government has for its
people, it remains steadfastly opposed to human security as a basis for
outside intervention into its sovereign affairs. For Japan, human
security is almost entirely an external project; for China, human
security is only a matter of domestic affairs. As Chinese scholar Li
Dongyan observed:
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Chinese human security proponents do not exclude
sovereignty security and the principle of non-
intervention. Even the most active advocates of human
security believe that judgments about the human
security situation should be based on domestic
judgments, not on judgments by people or governments
outside the state. Therefore, human security should not
become an excuse for foreign interference in domestic
affairs.42
The human security picture is perhaps most complicated with
respect to India. As with Japan and China, the idea of using human
security as a framing concept has been debated and analyzed in India.
The range of traditional and nontraditional security threats that India
faces gives the human security concept plenty of traction in the context
of India's external and internal affairs. India's longstanding
commitment to principles of sovereignty and noninterference-and its
use of those principles to chastise foreign critics of Indian domestic
affairs-leaves India with little basis for making human security an
element of its foreign policy and relations with other countries,
especially other Asian countries. Aspects of Indian foreign policy that
might reflect elements of the human security agenda, such as
democracy promotion, have been limited in nature and typically can also
be explained by Indian geopolitical interests.43 Indian bilateral relations
and assistance with other countries, such as those in Africa, are
predicated on the principles of respect for sovereignty and
noninterference. This strategy means that India's efforts to increase its
political and economic prominence in the world are not based on
advancing a robust notion of human security.
Looking across the Japanese, Chinese, and Indian approaches to
human security, the key common theme is clear subordination of human
security advocacy to the principles of sovereignty and noninterference in
the domestic affairs of states. However, this theme runs counter to what
many consider the key aspect of the concept of human security: human
security from fear and want cannot be obscured by incantations of
42. Li Dongyan, China's Approach to Non-Traditional Security (NTS) (Mar. 8 2007)
(manuscript available at http://ieas.berkeley.edu/events/pdf/2007.03.08LiDongyan.pdi)
(last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
43. See Jan Cartwright, India's Regional and International Support for Democracy:
Rhetoric or Reality?, 49 ASIAN SURv. 403, 406 (2009) (arguing that "India's apparent
increasing support for democracy is predicated more on 'realist' political concerns about
the country's strategic and economic interests, rather than an idealistic predisposition to
support the spread of 'democracy' as a goal in and of itself').
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sovereignty and noninterference. In short, the main elements of the
Asian perspective on international law and global governance, overall,
do not combine in a manner receptive to the prevailing content of the
human security concept.
III. AN EASTPHALIAN PERSPECTIVE ON HUMAN SECURITY THROUGH
CONFUCIANISM?
The distinctive Asian perspective on international law and global
governance emphasizes principles and rules historically associated with
the Westphalian state system. In this context, although the Asian
region is a fascinating laboratory for the future of human security,
advocacy for more robust national and international action to promote
human security faces a fairly hostile environment. Any change that is
likely to occur in this situation will have to arise from within the Asian
framework, through a connection with Asian ideas and beliefs. This
section analyzes whether the philosophical heritage of Confucianism
shared by many Asian societies might contain some foundations for an
Asian human security perspective thatdoes not stand firmly behind the
principles of sovereignty and noninterference."
Philosophically, the Confucian perspective contains features that
resonate with the human security idea, particularly the emphasis
Confucius and Mencius placed on the ruler's duty to secure his people's
physical safety-freedom from fear-and basic material needs-freedom
from want. As explored below, Confucianism even contained the idea
that one state could intervene with military force in another state whose
rulers failed to secure such basic levels of individual security and
subsistence. Thus, one can find in Confucian thought features that
resemble-if only in a rudimentary way-human security's universal
scope, its concern with holding leaders accountable, and its integration
of mechanisms to intervene when human security is threatened.
The key concept of Confucianism with regard to world politics can
be found in the concepts of Ping and Tian-Xia. According to Confucius,
Ping can be understood as peace, harmony, evenness, equality, fairness,
justice and the like. For the achievement of Ping, Confucius believed
that states and their peoples needed a sense of peace and tranquility
44. Indian civilization, for example, was not as influenced by Confucianism as
civilizations in Southeast and East Asian nations, which makes this inquiry into
Confucianism of limited prescriptive relevance to Indian attitudes towards human
security.
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that transcended territorial borders.45 In addition, the optimal world
order, which is directed by Tian-Xia, an ideal moral and political order
admitting of no territorial boundaries, should be achieved according to
the principle of right, virtues, and the aims of Ping.6 Thus, Confucius
seemed to shut down any possibility of a good war between sovereign
states.47
However, Confucians recognized two exceptional cases that justified
war: self-defense and the limited use of force against tyranny and
oppression in other states, which, in Confucian terms, is called "punitive
expedition., 48 Confucians' perspective on self-defense is reflected in
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, and the punitive expedition notion
shares, at first glance, some qualities with claims that humanitarian
intervention is justified under certain circumstances in international
law. The main reason why Confucians allowed two kinds of use of force
is evident-protection and promotion of the daily lives of individuals.
Ping and Tian-Xia cannot be achieved without the welfare of the people,
and Confucians allowed the two uses of force as necessary evils for
restoration of the ideal world in situations in the non-ideal world, such
as war and armed conflict. Thus, the human security concern with
freedom from fear has some equivalent features in the philosophy of
Confucius.
When it comes to freedom from want, Confucian teachings also
resonate with aspects of the human security idea. Confucians repeatedly
stressed that the ultimate goal of states is to secure the basic means of
subsistence of people, not to perpetuate the power of an elite ruling
class. This Confucian perspective on freedom could justify humanitarian
intervention or measures based on a principle of responsibility to protect
against a state that fundamentally fails to secure the basic subsistence
of its people. Under a Confucian approach, humanitarian intervention is
justified in cases in which a foreign ruler or state deliberately denies its
population the basic means of subsistence (e.g., intentional starvation),
or in which a state has collapsed, exposing the population to widespread
famine and starvation.49 For instance, if true, the North Korean
government's deliberate starvation of its people could trigger a
Confucian justification for humanitarian intervention.
45. Frederick Tse-Shyang Chen, The Confucian View of World Order, in THE
INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 31, 32 (Mark W.
Janis ed., 1991).
46. DANIEL A. BELL, BEYOND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL THINKING FOR AN EAST
ASIAN CONTEXT 24 (2006).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 36-38.
49. Id. at 47.
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Considering these fundamental concepts of Confucianism, which
focus on the protection of the human being under the rule of Ping and
Tian-Xia, a Confucian approach to human security provides reasons
why an Eastphalian order could incorporate a concept of human
security into international policy without viewing the idea as an
imposition on Asian countries by the West. Moreover, a Confucian
approach provides philosophical grounds for an Eastphalian order that
seeks to establish a more people-centered global order, rather than just
a great power dominated, multipolar balance of power.
IV. ACHIEVING HUMAN SECURITY WITH AN ASIAN FACE:
A TASK AT THE HEART OF EASTPHALIA
Whether Confucian reasoning can produce a more robust Asian
approach to human security is, of course, doubtful given the strength of
the Asian commitment to sovereignty and noninterference. As noted
above, the concept of human security looks past sovereignty and has
little patience with states arguing that sovereignty prevents outsiders
from assessing their behavior within their own territories. The robust
emphasis of Asian countries on the principle of sovereignty and
nonintervention conflicts with this aspect of human security because the
emphasis values sovereignty more than transnational efforts to develop
better human security in all countries. In this respect, Asian countries
tend to be consistent and similar because they oppose outside
interference in their own affairs. Accordingly, they refrain from
criticizing and intervening in each other's domestic affairs. This
consistency stands as an obstacle to the need within the human security
project for mechanisms to probe the performance of states and intervene
when states fail to protect and promote freedom from fear and want.
Other factors also stand in the way of a strong, distinctively Asian
notion of human security, particularly the political suspicions that
would immediately arise should Japan, China, or India decide to
embrace human security policies in a way that involves more
interference with other states' domestic affairs. Japan's unfortunate
historical legacy in Asia from the 1930s and 1940s serves as one reason
why it can only implement its human security policies in the region in
ways that do not threaten sovereignty and noninterference. Suspicions
about Chinese power and influence are also present, making countries
highly attuned to any shifts in Chinese policies that would amount to
intervention, however softly peddled. In addition, an Indian push for
sharper-edged human security policies would give countries an
opportunity for them to play the "China card" and threaten to cooperate
more closely politically and economically with China rather than India.
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More conceptually, the attitudes of Asian countries toward the
human security idea also serve as a reminder that many in Asia reject
the universalism of values as a premise for international law and global
governance because, in the experience of Asian countries, universalism
is typically pushed by those seeking to exercise superior power. This
attitude extends back to Asian participation in efforts by developing
countries during the Cold War to stress the importance of peaceful
coexistence (e.g., the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the
Bandung Spirit'0 ), an approach based on respecting the political,
economic, and cultural differences among states.
However much the rhetoric surrounding human security is
universalized, the concept is still associated with ideas and values thus
far promoted mainly by developed Western countries. Continued
advocacy for Asian countries' distinctiveness reveals a skepticism about,
and opposition to, viewing Western values as the template for
governance in societies with different civilizational and political
histories. Approaching human security should, therefore, be a more
conservative undertaking that respects different traditions and
conceptions of the good society, and this is precisely what we see in the
very different approaches of Japan, China, and India.
Two other elements of the Asian perspective augment this more
conservative take on human security. First, as noted above, the
skepticism about universal values relates directly back to the political
experiences of Asian peoples as the victims of Western imperial power
and prejudice. The Asian perspective stands as a warning of the dangers
of pretending that power and principle are not two sides of the same
coin in international affairs. Second, in human security terms, the Asian
perspective has focused more attention on economic, social, and cultural
rights, which by their very nature and design in international law are
relative to a country's level of political, economic, and social
development. In short, beyond perhaps some minimal core content,
economic, social, and cultural rights lack clear universally applicable
meaning, unlike most Western-backed civil and political rights. This
context gives human security as freedom from want less traction as a
clear universal requirement of good governance.
Frustration in the West with Asian preference for principles of near-
absolute sovereignty and nonintervention arise in part because the
Asian perspective does not appear to contain any positive ideas on how
states should deal with atrocities, oppression, and failure to provide
basic subsistence taking place in other countries. The contrast between
50. See Wang Tieya, International Law in China: Historical and Contemporary
Perspectives, 221 RECUEIL DES COURS II [COLLECTED COURSES] 203, 263 (1990)
(discussing China's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the Bandung Spirit).
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Western and Asian perspectives on human security issues, especially
humanitarian intervention, are perhaps most stark in connection with
Myanmar. Generally speaking, Western countries have favored more
interventionist policies for trying to address the nightmare the junta in
Myanmar is creating for its people and the region. Asian countries have
generally opposed intervention and have been unwilling to engage the
junta strongly enough to force a change in policy. This contrast was
again present in the wake of the devastating cyclone that struck
Myanmar in 2008.'
The post-cyclone devastation in Myanmar, combined with the
junta's deliberate efforts not to allow foreign humanitarian assistance to
reach desperate populations, created a humanitarian crisis that
Confucianism might recognize as a candidate for justified humanitarian
intervention. The cyclone massively threatened the ability of people in
Myanmar to access basic survival goods, including food, water, and
shelter, and the junta deliberately prevented foreign humanitarian
assistance from reaching people facing life-threatening conditions.
Confucian conceptions of good governance would recognize nothing the
junta did in the aftermath of the cyclone as satisfying the ruler's duties
to ensure the basic subsistence needs of his people. The Asian
perspective seemed fixated on defending sovereignty and the principle of
nonintervention at all costs. Undoubtedly, Asian countries offered
Myanmar support and disaster relief supplies, but there is no evidence
of a concerted effort made by Asian countries to prod Myanmar to
perform more effectively in responding to this disaster. No Asian
version of a "responsibility to protect" principle was present in this
episode.
Measured against the quintessentially post-Westphalian concept of
human security, the Eastphalian approach looks rather Westphalian in
comparison because of its continued emphasis on sovereignty and
nonintervention into the domestic affairs of states. The Asian
perspective raises, however, hard questions about the post-Westphalian
conception of human security and its future. The most important of
these questions is whether the prevailing concept of human security and
its corollary-the principle of the responsibility to protect-constitute
the best approach for states and the international community to achieve
freedom from fear and freedom from want. From the Asian perspective,
the concept of human security looks like another "one size fits all"
solution advocated by Western countries and human rights advocates
51. On the situation in Myanmar as it relates to humanitarian intervention, see
Madeleine K. Albright, The End of Intervention, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2008, at A23; Saw
Yan Naing, Humanitarian Intervention Calls Increase, THE IRRAWADDY, May 12, 2008,
available at http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art-id=11982.
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that ignores the progress Asia has made as a region in advancing
freedom from fear and freedom from want without diluting sovereignty
and engaging in interventions.
For example, the U.N. reported that Asia's economic growth has
reduced extreme poverty and hunger dramatically, which is the first of
the Millennium Development Goals.52 Progress on reducing extreme
poverty and hunger qualifies as direct progress on increasing freedom
from want within the region. Further, the larger political impacts of
higher standards of living indirectly reduce the threat of civil unrest
and conflict, thus supporting freedom from fear. Despite tensions and
differences, Asian countries have also avoided becoming engaged in
interstate wars as the region has grown in economic and political
significance. The absence of such wars strengthens freedom from fear
within the region as well. These achievements in Asia are, of course,
linked to other global phenomena, such as the foundation for global
trade provided by WTO, and to active Asian participation in the
workings of international and regional governance, such as the United
Nations and ASEAN. Nevertheless, avoiding large-scale wars,
significantly increasing economic growth, and reducing extreme poverty
and hunger are noteworthy human security achievements within the
Asian region that were accomplished without subordinating sovereignty
or fostering interventionist policies.
In short, the dissonance between the prevailing concept of human
security and elements of the Asian perspective on international
relations should not imply that Asian countries have failed to improve
human security. Asian nations have made improvements, in fact, by
following a different approach than the one found in the human security
project associated with the continued attempt to universalize Western
liberalism. The gains made in Asia do not mean that human security
problems are few or far between in Asian countries. Asia today contains
the best of the first world and the worst of the third world, which makes
the region such a fascinating potential laboratory for global governance
on human security.
The Eastphalian recipe for dealing with human security problems
is, however, more conservative and Westphalian than the prevailing
concept of human security pushed in the West. At the macro-political
level, this recipe involves robust national engagement with the global
economic and financial system as a means of increasing national and
regional economic and material wealth, in addition to strenuous efforts
to avoid interstate war and conflict. These strategies require no radical
52. U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, The Millennium Development Goals Report
2005, at 6 (2005), available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/pdf/MDG%20Book.pdf.
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revisions of existing bodies of international law on the use of force and
international economic cooperation. In terms of how each country
internally manages its economic and political affairs, the Eastphalian
approach stresses the need for each government to understand and
faithfully honor the duty it owes to provide security and subsistence for
its people. In the Eastphalian context, this duty is informed more by the
importance of economic, social, and cultural rights than Western
practices stressing civil and political rights.
How any individual government specifically fulfills its duty is not a
basis for foreign interference and intervention into its domestic affairs.
The Eastphalian approach is tolerant of differences in governmental
regimes, economic systems, and cultural traditions. Changes to such
regimes, systems, and traditions will occur, particularly in the context
of intensifying globalization, but the changes should be as indigenous as
possible and flow from within the country rather than being imposed or
manipulated from without. Both the philosophical heritage and
historical political experiences of Asian countries tend to equate foreign
intolerance of differences with the arrogant ambition of superior power.
Thus, the Eastphalian perspective can embrace human security as an
objective but can also differ from Western champions of this idea in how
states and societies should pursue this objective. The Eastphalian
approach to human security does not give international law and global
governance mechanisms much leverage, if any, in terms of advancing
human security globally.
V. CONCLUSION: THE DESTINY OF HUMAN SECURITY IN AN
EASTPHALIA ORDER
The Asian perspective on human security is important for
international law and global governance in the future because this
concept emerged in the post-Cold War period as a leading normative
development with deep implications for international law and global
governance. As discussed in this article, the Asian approach to
international relations and the prevailing post-Westphalian nature of
the human security concept do not share much, if any, common ground.
In short, the Asian perspective offers little for advocates of human
security to embrace.
This fundamental divergence is not about the importance of
governments working towards freedom from fear and freedom from
want; rather, the divergence appears in how states should go about
engaging each other in the pursuit of these objectives. Asian countries
can claim that their approach leads to gains in human security, as
illustrated by the absence of interstate wars among Asian countries and
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the significant reductions in extreme poverty and hunger Asian
countries have made through economic growth. All the attention to the
rise of Asia must mean that Asian countries have more to offer to the
conceptualization of human security than empty incantations about the
absolute nature of the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention.
But what exactly Asian countries have to offer in terms of the idea
of human security within an Asian-centric international system is still
difficult to describe. At present, the best description might be that Asian
countries accept that human security is important but that its
achievement remains the exclusive domain of the sovereign state and
cannot serve as the basis for interference with domestic affairs. In other
words, human security's importance is primarily a matter for domestic
politics according to each country's own political system and traditions.
This approach, of course, leaves international law and global
governance with no direct role in fostering human security, a
proposition unlikely to be welcomed by human security proponents with
a more jaundiced view of sovereignty and more faith in transnational
activism on behalf of universal human rights within a more radical
understanding of the roles of international law and global governance.
The emergence of an Eastphalian order will not quiet discontent
among those who believe that sovereignty and nonintervention are
barriers to global human progress. However, the combination of growing
Asian material power and political influence, Asian commitment to the
principles of sovereignty and nonintervention, and Asian diplomatic
practices that adhere to those principles will make an Asian-centric
international system a harsher environment for the concept of human
security than the Western-dominated, post-Westphalian period ushered
in by the end of the Cold War. This difficult transition into Eastphalia
for the concept of human security will only be eased if Asian powers
take active steps to incorporate human security thinking more robustly
into their responsibilities in the new world order. At present, the
prospects for such a change are slim, and any idea of what such change
might actually look like remains a mystery.
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